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This paper explores endogenous institution formation 
under a catching-up strategy in developing countries. 
Since the catching-up strategy is normally against the 
compartive advantages of the developing countries, it 
can not be implemented through laissez-faire market 
mechanisms, and a government needs to establish non-
market institutions to implement the strategy. In a simple 
two-sector model, the authors show that an institutional 
complex of price distortion, output control, and a 
directive allocation system is sufficient to implement the 
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study development strategies and economic growth in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at zhiyun.li@univ.ox.ac.uk.
best allocation for the catching-up strategy. Furthermore, 
removing any of the three components will make it 
no longer implementable. The analysis also compares 
the best allocation and prices under the catching-up 
strategy with their counterparts under no distortions. 
The results of this paper provide important implications 
for understanding the institution formation in the 
developing countries that were pursuing a catching-up 
strategy after World War II.1 Introduction
After World War II, many former colonial or semi-colonial countries in Asia,
Africa and Latin America achieved their political independence. After that,
how to realize rapid economic development and also achieve economic in-
dependence became new challenges for political leaders in those countries.
Compared with industrialized countries, such as the United States and coun-
tries in Western Europe, these newly independent and less developed coun-
tries had extremely low income levels, living standards and economic growth
rates. A common feature of the developing countries was that they heav-
ily specialized in the production and export of primary commodities, and
imported most industrial goods from the wealthy industrialized countries.
Historically, the lack of modern industrial sectors, especially heavy indus-
tries, which were the basis of military strength and economic power, had
forced many countries in the developing world to yield to the colonial pow-
ers. After achieving independence, the political leaders and elites in those
countries naturally experienced an impetus towards the rapid development
of large heavy industries, and commonly adopted an ideology of economic
nationalism (Lal and Myint, 1996, chapter 7).
In the 1940s and 1950s, with still fresh memories of the Great Depression
in capitalist countries, economists and policy makers began to cast doubt on
the sound functioning of a laissez-faire market mechanism, even in ￿ edging
market economies. The rise of Keynesism as a new economic doctrine in
the Western countries also re￿ ected the belief that the market encompassed
insurmountable defects, and government needed to provide supplementary
policy measures to sustain a stable and well-functioning economy. In sharp
contrast to the deep crisis in the Western countries in the 1930s, the socialist
Soviet Union, having adopted a planned economic system and prioritized the
development of heavy industries, was experiencing rapid economic growth
and successfully transformed itself from a traditional agrarian economy into
an industrial economy1. That seemingly great success of the Soviet Union,
at least at that time, in￿ uenced the political leaders of the developing coun-
1After succeeding Lenin and consolidating his power, in 1929, Stalin started to pursue
in earnest the prioritized development of heavy industries through a series of ￿ve-year plans
(Gregory and Harrison, 2005; Gregory and Stuart, 2001). The share of heavy industry in
Soviet industrial output rose rapidly (Moravcik, 1965; Allen, 2003) and the Soviet Union
quickly became a global military power before World War II.
1tries, whether they were socialist countries or not, and encouraged them to
adopt similar strategies to achieve rapid industrialization2.
With the desire for rapid industrialization, the governments in the de-
veloping countries took various measures to facilitate the growth of the in-
dustrial sector. And it was commonly believed that a high proportion of
economic surplus should be directed to investment in industrial sectors, just
as had been done in the period of "socialistic primary accumulation" in the
Soviet Union.
One important ￿nding is that, though the developing countries were
quite di⁄erent from each other in political regime, economic size, geographic
features and cultural traditions, very similar institutions were established in
those countries after World War II, to implement the catching-up strategy
of rapid industrialization. In this paper, we will investigate the rationale
behind those institutional arrangements, and use a simple model to show
that such institution formation is endogenous to a government￿ s adoption of
catching-up strategies.
Institution here is de￿ned as a set of non-technologically determined
constraints that govern and shape economic agents￿interactions, in part
helping them to form expectations of other agents￿actions and the results
of their own actions (Lin and Nugent, 1995; Greif, 1998). It is clear from this
de￿nition that institutions consist of both formal entities, like laws, state-
mandated rules, and commercial contracts, and informal ones, like social
norms, customs and ideologies.
Among the similar institutional arrangements across the developing coun-
tries implementing catching-up strategies, the ￿rst and most important was
price distortion, such as the "price scissor" adopted mainly in socialist coun-
tries and the "import substitution" policy adopted in many other devel-
oping countries. Price scissor was a kind of price discrimination against
non-industrial sectors, such as agriculture. For example, in China and the
Soviet Union, agricultural products were procured by the government at
2In Krueger￿ s (1995) article in the Handbook of Development Economics, she summa-
rized ￿ve dominant thoughts in development economics, as below: 1) the desire and drive
for "modernization"; 2) the interpretation of "industrialization" as the route to modern-
ization; 3) the belief in "import substitution" as a necessary policy to provide protection
for new "infant" industries; 4) the distrust of the private sector and the market and the
belief that government should take the leading role in development; and 5) a distrust of
the international economy and pessimism that exports from developing countries could
grow.
2prices lower than market equilibrium prices, and sold at those low prices to
residents in urban areas where the industries were located. "Import sub-
stitution" implies that governments export domestic primary goods, while
prohibiting the import of industrial products, so as to protect the develop-
ment of domestic industrial sectors. It was adopted by many Latin Ameri-
can countries from the 1930s to the late 1980s. Under import substitution,
the prices of domestic industrial products were normally higher than corre-
sponding international prices3. In essence, import substitution is also, at
least partially, a kind of price distortion.
The second kind of institutional arrangement is directive allocation sys-
tems for output and production factors. In many developing countries,
the procurement and sale of commodities at regulated prices were typically
operated and controlled by the governments, and the allocation of produc-
tion factors was commonly through directive allocation, rather than mar-
ket mechanisms. As a result the public sector played an important role in
non-socialist developing countries implementing catching-up strategies. For
example, in India, 62.1% of total productive capital and 26.7% of total labor
in industry was in the public sector by 1978-1979 (Krueger, 1995), and in
Brazil, in 1984, 81 of the 200 largest enterprises were state-owned, which
accounted for 74.2% of the total capital and 56.3% of the total net income
(Lin, et. al, 1999, Chapter 2).
Third and ￿nally, the governments adopting a catching-up strategy heav-
ily intervened in the production decision of enterprises, through such mea-
sures as government ownership, direct government operation, investment
licensing, etc. It is understandable that, in socialist countries, nearly all
the economic activities were directly or indirectly under the control of gov-
ernment. However, in non-socialist developing countries, there was also ex-
tensive government intervention in the production activities of enterprises.
For example, in post war India, government permission was required for new
investment by any of the 20 largest industrial houses, and it was permissi-
ble only when that investment could not be carried out by other industrial
houses (Krueger, 1995). In fact, in those developing countries, even the
private sectors were subject to substantial control by the state political and
3It was documented that, in India, the e⁄ective rate of protection (ERP) were well
above 100% for 39 industries (of a 76 industry classi￿cation) in 1968-69 (Bhagwati and
Srinivasan,1975), and in Turkey, the ERPs of the infant industries were normally over
200% even after twenty years of their establishment (Krueger and Tuncer, 1982).
3economic apparatus, among which the most important is output control.
In this paper, we will argue that the institutional complex of price dis-
tortion, output control and directive allocation is indeed endogenous to the
government choice of catching-up strategies in the developing countries (Lin,
et. al, 1994, 1996, 2007)4. The endowment structures of the developing
countries commonly featur scarcity in capital and abundance in labor sup-
ply, while the development of industries, especially heavy industries, requires
huge amounts of capital investment. Given the endowment structures of
the developing countries, prioritizing the development of industrial sectors
is obviously against the comparative advantages of the economies, and en-
terprises in heavy industry sectors are not viable in free competitive markets
(Lin, 2003). Therefore, that kind of catching-up strategy can not be im-
plemented through laissez-faire market mechanisms. To implement that
strategy, the government needs to exclude market functioning and establish
certain institutional arrangements that can facilitate the development of the
industrial sectors.
First of all, a government pursuing catching-up strategies needs to re-
duce the costs of industrial production. Capital is expensive in the de-
veloping countries and market interest rates are high, which implies that
capital-intensive production should be quite costly and non-pro￿table in the
developing countries. To reduce production costs, the government needs
to ￿x the interest rates at low levels, and reduce the prices of consumption
goods, such as agriculture products, because cheaper consumption goods
will reduce the labor costs of the industrial sectors. Through this kind
of price distortion, the government can reduce the costs of industrial pro-
duction. As was mentioned before, "price scissor" in both socialist and
non-socialist economies5 and the policy of "import substitution" adopted
by many developing country governments can be grouped into the institu-
tional arrangement of price distortion.
Second, the government needs to set up a directive allocation system.
Price distortion implies that the prices of many products are arti￿cially set
4The institution in this paper refers to institution arrangement when is a set of behav-
ioral rules that govern agents￿behaviors in speci￿ed domains, not instituional structure
which is totality of institutional arrangements (Lin and Nugent, 1995).
5Sah and Stiglitz (1984) investigate the e⁄ects of price scissors on industrial accumu-
lation in socialist countries. Rattsł and Torvik (2003) study the price discrimination
against agriculture to promote industrialization in Sub-Saharn Africa.
4at below market-clearing levels, and as a result, there exists excess demand
for those products. To su¢ ciently allocate the under-priced products and
factors to target industries, the government needs to establish a directive
allocation system, and secure its position as monopolistic purchaser of those
goods. Otherwise, either non-industrial sectors will compete with industrial
sectors for those under-priced goods, or they can be sold in other markets at
higher prices. This also explains the agriculture collectivization movements
in China and the Soviet Union, and why public ownership and direct govern-
ment control were also prevalent in many non-socialist developing countries.
Finally, the government also needs to intervene in the enterprises￿pro-
duction activities. When workers in enterprises can freely decide how much
to produce or how high to set their wages, they will take action for their own
bene￿ts. For example, if wages are ￿xed by the government at low levels,
the workers will have low incentives to exert e⁄ort. In this case, an output
requirement set by the government may guarantee the lowest level of e⁄ort
input by the workers.
There has been a large literature studying the endogenous formation of
economic or political institutions and the government￿ s role in economic de-
velopment. The early literature commonly assumed that the government
acts as a benevolent social guardian of the economy, and its role is to es-
tablish certain institutions and take relevant measures just to compensate
for the defects of the market mechanism. But later observation of inef-
￿cient government intervention and government corruption has led to new
consideration of the role of the government and the formation of economic
and political institutions. A new strand of literature began to explore this
problem from the perspective of political economy, by clearly introducing
the incentives of politicians in the government and interest groups (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1998; Acemoglu, 2006,
2007). According to this theory, the government intervenes in the economy
and establishes certain institutional arrangements to maximize the payo⁄s of
special interest groups, or merely for the purpose of rent-seeking. Shleifer
and Vishny (1994, 1998) emphasize the grabbing-hand nature of govern-
ments and suggest that government controls over enterprises come about
when politicians can use public resources to buy o⁄enterprise managers, for
their cooperation in redistributing economic or political rents. Acemoglu
(2006) shows in a simple model that political elites choose policies to in-
5crease their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the
rest of society to themselves, which leads to distortions and thus ine¢ cient
allocation in the economy.
However, in the developing countries that were pursuing the catching-up
strategies, the establishment of various institutional arrangements by the
governments was obviously not for the purpose of acquiring rents by the
political elites, and neither were there particular bene￿ciary groups of those
institutional arrangements, at least in the short run (Lin, et al., 2006). In
such economic environments where economic activities were highly regulated
and the role of the market was relatively limited, the political elites did not
have much room for rent-seeking either. On the contrary, during the tran-
sition period of many socialist countries in the 1990s, with the collapse of
traditional plan systems, there were much more serious corruption problems
in the governments than before. In fact, the political leaders of those devel-
oping countries adopted the catching-up strategies under the good will that
national prosperity can soon be achieved through rapid industrialization.
In this paper, in a simple two-sector model, we will prove that, in the
developing countries, the formation of that special institutional complex of
price distortion, directive allocation and output control is endogenous to
the governments￿adoption of a catching-up strategy. Furthermore, that
institution complex is both necessary and su¢ cient for implementing the
best allocation for catching-up strategy. In our two-sector model, e⁄ort is
introduced as an inherent control variable of economic agents, which is not
observable and cannot be directly controlled by the government. But the
behaviors of the agents can be indirectly regulated by the external economic
environments, which is designed purposely by the government. So the prob-
lem of the government is how to design optimal institutional arrangements
to implement the best allocation for catching-up strategy, given the interest
con￿ ict and incentive problem of the economic agents.
We prove in our model that the best allocation is implementable by
a combination of price distortion, directive allocation system and output
control, and none of these three components is dispensable for that imple-
mentation. The intuition behind this result is that, without output control,
the agents will reduce their e⁄ort inputs and less outputs in both sectors will
be produced, and as a result, less surplus can be mobilized for capital accu-
mulation. Without price distortion, the equilibrium price of consumption
6goods will be higher, and therefore raise the labor cost of production. And
without directive allocation of capital, the agents can adjust their capital
demands to e⁄ort inputs, which will ￿nally result in more consumption and
less capital accumulation.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2
presents a basic two-sector model, and characterizes the optimal allocation
and shadow prices under no distortion. Section 3 introduces the catching-
up strategy into the model. By solving a central planner￿ s problem, we
characterize the best allocation for implementing that catching-up strat-
egy. Section 4 turns to study the implementation of that best allocation
by the government, and proves that that best allocation is implementable
by an institutional complex of price distortion, output control and direc-
tive allocation system. Section 5 is a counter-factural analysis, where we
alternatively remove one part of that institutional complex, while keeping
the other two parts unchanged, and explore its impact on ￿nal allocations.
Section 6 is a short conclusion.
2 The Model and Optimal Allocation
2.1 Model Setup
There are two sectors in the economy: capital goods sector and consumption
goods sector. The production of either goods requires both capital and
labor inputs. Total capital K = K1 + K2, where K1 is capital input in the
capital goods sector and K2 in the consumption goods sector. Similarly, we
have total labor L = L1 + L2. It is assumed that labor is not intersectoral
transferrable in our economy6. For simplicity and without loss of generality,
we normalize L = 1 and let L1 = ￿ and L2 = 1 ￿ ￿, ￿ 2 (0;1). The
endowment structure of the economy is measured by per capita capital,
k = K=L, which is normally low in the developing countries.
The production of capital goods (goods 1) is more capital intensive than
that of consumption goods 2 (goods 2), and their production functions are
Yj = Fj(Kj;ejLj) j = 1;2
6For example, in China, peasants in rural areas are not allowed to work in manufactories
in urban areas, under the regulation of hukou system. Also, the production of di⁄erent
goods requires di⁄erent skills, and it is di¢ cult for workers in one sector to acquire the
required skills for production in another sector in short time.
7where ej is the per capita e⁄ort input of a worker in sector j, and ejLj may
be interpreted as e⁄ective labor input. We assume workers in the same
sector are homogenous. The production function Fj(￿;￿) is homogenous
of degree one in Kj and ejLj. Per capita output and per capita capital
in sector j are respectively yj =
Yj
Lj and kj =
Kj
Lj . Total capital balance




;ej) = fj(kj;ej) j = 1;2 (1)
It is obvious that fj(kj;ej) is homogenous of degree one in kj and ej. Con-
sumption goods 2 can be used only for consumption and are not preservable,
and capital goods 1 can be used for either consumption or investment.
Though economic agents in both sectors are assumed to have the same
preference, they are heterogenous in essence since they are in di⁄erent sec-
tors, having di⁄erent skills, and labor is not intersectoral transferrable. The
utility function of agents in sector j is
Uj(x1j;x2j;ej) = u(x1j;x2j) ￿ C(ej) (2)
where xij is the amount of goods i consumed by an agent in sector j, and
ej is his e⁄ort input. u(￿;￿) is strictly concave in (x1j;x2j) and satis￿es
the Inada conditions, and the disutility of e⁄ort, C(ej), is strictly convex
satisfying the conditions that C0(0) = 0 and C0(1) = 1.
2.2 Optimal Allocation
For later comparison with distorted allocation under catching-up strategy,
we ￿rst study the optimal allocation in the benchmark case of no distortion.
The social welfare function is standard and de￿ned as
W(xij;ej) = ￿[u(x11;x21) ￿ C(e1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x12;x22) ￿ C(e2)] (3)
8and the optimal allocation is to maximize social welfare under resource and
technology constraints, that is
PO
max W(x11;x21;x12;x22;e1;e2)
s:t: ￿x11 + (1 ￿ ￿)x12 = ￿f1(k1;e1)
￿x21 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22 = (1 ￿ ￿)f2(k2;e2)
￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 = k
The Lagrangian of problem PO is
L = ￿[u(x11;x21) ￿ C(e1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x12;x22) ￿ C(e2)]
￿￿1 [￿x11 + (1 ￿ ￿)x12 ￿ ￿f1(k1;e1)]
￿￿2[￿x21 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f2(k2;e2)]
￿￿3[￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 ￿ k ]














and the technology and resource constraints
￿x11 + (1 ￿ ￿)x12 = ￿f1(k1;e1) (4)
￿x12 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22 = (1 ￿ ￿)f2(k2;e2) (5)
￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 = k (6)








prices of goods 1,2 and capital in optimal allocation f￿1;￿2;￿3g. Accord-
ing to the second theorem of welfare economics, under our assumptions
of technology, preference and labor heterogeneity, the optimal allocation is
supportable by a Walrasian equilibrium. If we take capital goods 1 as


















Therefore, the optimal allocation can be implemented by a market mecha-
nism 7. We next characterize the optimal allocation and shadow prices in
a speci￿c example.
Example 1 C(e) = 1
2e2 u(x1j;x2j) = ￿ lnx1j+(1￿￿)lnx2j f1(k1;e1) =
A1k￿
1e1￿￿




2 with 1 > ￿ > ￿ > 0.
Solving the optimal conditions and technology and resource constraints,
we get that
x11 = x12 =
￿
￿1





























k = ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2
There are nine equations and nine unknowns, and it is easy to get the close-
form solutions. We summarize the main results of optimal allocation in the
example below:







7For the implementation problem, an implicit assumption is that it is a private market
economy, and producers face perfect competition.
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There is a linear relationship between k￿







and the per capita capital of the capital goods sector is higher than that of
the consumption goods sector if and only if
￿￿(1￿￿)




￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿
(14)
In the developing countries, most of the labor lies in the agriculture sector
and the ratio of labor in the industry sector, ￿, is low. We may assume
the above condition is satis￿ed in the developing countries. The optimal





























2 [￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿k￿ (16)

































￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
k
￿￿
j￿ s are respectively the nominal shadow prices of capital goods, consump-
tion goods and capital. Given our assumption of preference and production
functions, we know from the second theorem of welfare economics that the
above optimal allocations are supportable by a Walrasian equilibrium, for




. When applying the
second theorem of welfare economics, we have implicitly assumed that the
government is able to enact lump-sum redistribution of the initial capital
endowments in these two sectors. If we take the capital goods as numeraire,
we get the following results about the supporting prices.
Corollary 3 In a Walrasian equilibrium that supports the optimal alloca-




























































[￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ k￿ (20)
123 Catching-Up Strategy and a Central Planner
Problem
In this section, we introduce the catching-up strategy into the model, and
by solving a central planner￿ s problem, we characterize the best allocation
for implementing that strategy. In the next section, we will study how
to implement that best allocation, given the interest con￿ icts between the
agents and the government. Similar to Sah and Stiglitz (1984, 1987), we
study this problem in a static model, and thus abstract the dynamic e⁄ects
of industrial accumulation. However, it will be clear that a static model is
su¢ cient to capture the main trade-o⁄s that determine the endogeneity of
institutional formation under a catching-up strategy.
As was stated above, when implementing a catching-up strategy, the
government in a developing country tries to mobilize enough economic sur-
plus to invest in industry. In our model, since consumption goods can only
be used for consumption, the total surplus that is available for investment
in industrial sectors is the net output of capital goods, I, that is,
I = ￿f1(k1;e1) ￿ ￿x11 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)x12 (21)
The total amount of industrial accumulation is equal to the di⁄erence be-
tween total output and consumption of capital goods. We assume the
government￿ s objective function is a weighted average of social welfare and
industrial accumulation I in the following form
UG(xij;ej) = W(xij;ej) + ￿I (22)
where ￿ is a weight proxy of I in government￿ s objective function. When
￿ = 0, UG returns to the benchmark case of the social welfare function.
And the central planner problem for the government is thus
PC
max ￿[u(x11;x21) ￿ C(e1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x12;x22) ￿ C(e2)] + ￿I
s:t: ￿x11 + (1 ￿ ￿)x12 + I = ￿f1(k1;e1)
￿x12 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22 = (1 ￿ ￿)f2(k2;e2)
￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 = k
13The Lagrangian of problem PC is
L = ￿[u(x11;x21) ￿ C(e1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[u(x12;x22) ￿ C(e2)] + ￿I
￿￿ ￿1 [￿x11 + (1 ￿ ￿)x12 + I ￿ ￿f1(k1;e1)]
￿￿ ￿2[￿x12 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f2(k2;e2)]
￿￿ ￿3[￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 ￿ k ]
Solving the optimal conditions, we have
u0
11 = u0
12 = ￿ = ￿ ￿1
u0
21 = u0
22 = ￿ ￿2
C0(e1) = ￿ ￿1f0
1;e1
C0(e2) = ￿ ￿2f0
2;e2
￿ ￿1f0
1;k1 = ￿ ￿2f0
2;k2 = ￿ ￿3
and the technology and technology constraints (21), (5) and (6). These
conditions characterize the best allocations
n
^ xij; ^ ej;^ kj
o
and shadow prices
f￿ ￿1; ￿ ￿2; ￿ ￿3g that maximize the objective functions of the government pur-
suing a catching-up strategy. Using the same example as before, it is easy
to get the following optimal conditions:














2 = ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)A2k
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k = ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2
It is di¢ cult to get the close-form solutions to problem PC, but the results
14summarized as below are enough for comparison with the results in the
optimal allocations.
Proposition 4 In a static two-sector economy, the best allocation
n
^ xij; ^ ej;^ kj
o
for implementing the catching-up strategy are














[￿(￿ + I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ k￿ (23)
^ x21 = ^ x22 =
A2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
1+￿
2




























The best allocations for the catching-up strategy are given in quasi-
reduced forms, and for given ^ I, there is also a linear relationship between
capital allocation in both sectors
^ k1 =
￿(￿ + I￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
^ k2
It is clear that whenever ^ I > 0, more capital needs to be allocated to the
capital goods sector in the best allocation. A quite intuitive result is that
the more bias toward the development of the capital goods sector, the more
output and accumulation of capital goods in the best allocation, which is
summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 5 In the central planner problem PC, the nominal GDP of the
capital goods sector increases with ￿, that is,
Y 0
1(￿) > 0








for I ￿ 0.
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2 = [￿Y1(￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿























f(￿ + ￿I)[￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿I + 2￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿g
where H = ￿2 ￿
￿(￿ + 1)(￿ + ￿I)2 + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿I)
￿
> 0. A su¢ cient
condition for I0(￿) is I ￿ 0.
The next result gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which
the best accumulation of capital goods is zero.













When ￿ > p￿
1, ^ I is strictly positive and increasing in ￿.
Interestingly, the right hand side of the equation is just the nominal
price of capital goods in the case of optimal allocations when there is no
distortion, that is ￿￿
1. So the result says that when the weight of industrial
accumulation is equal to the nominal price of capital goods in the optimal
allocation case, the government does not need to sacri￿ce capital goods
consumption for industrial accumulation. And when ￿ > p￿
1, the industrial
16accumulation ^ I is not only strictly positive but increasing in ￿. We also

























2 [￿(￿ + I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿k￿ (31)
Corollary 7 When ￿ > p￿
1, we have
^ k1 > k￿
1 , ^ k2 < k￿
2
^ e1 > e￿
1 , ^ e2 = e￿
2
^ q1 > q￿
1 , ^ q2 < q￿
2
The result is quite intuitive. In a central planner problem, when the
government (the central planner) is pursuing a catching-up strategy, more
capital will be allocated to the capital goods sector, workers in the capital
goods sector will work harder and capital goods output will increase. The
solutions to the Lagrangian multipliers are
￿ ￿1 = ￿ =
(￿ + I￿)
1￿￿






















￿ ￿3 = ￿ ￿2f0
2;k2 =
￿(￿ + I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
k
4 Implementation of a Catching-up Strategy
In this section we study the government problem of how to implement the
best allocation in the real world when there are interest con￿ icts between the
government and economic agents. We assume capital is owned by agents
with an initial capital endowment of ￿ kj for an agent in sector j. An agent
in sector j has two income sources: one is capital income rk, the other is
labor income wjej
8. An agent decides his demand and e⁄ort input to maxi-
mize his utility under various policy constraints imposed by the government,
8Here we normalize the hours of work for each agent as 1.
17with an objective function (2) di⁄erent from that of the government (22).
For example, unlike the government, the economic agents may not care
much about the development of heavy industries or accumulation of capi-
tal goods. To implement the best allocation for the catching-up strategy,
the government needs to establish relevant institutions and impose various
constraints on agents￿economic activities. Since that catching-up strategy
cannot be implemented through market mechanisms, restricting the func-
tioning of market mechanism is a natural objective of the government in
its design and establishment of relevant institutional arrangements. Those
institutional arrangements can be divided into three categories, and each
corresponds to special policy variables in our model:
1. Distorted price system, commonly known as "price scissor" in the lit-
erature, but the policy of "import substitution" is also a kind of price
distortion arrangement in essence. By distorted price system, we
mean in our model that product and factor prices are control vari-
ables of the government, including the relative price of consumption
goods p, interest rate r and wage levels wj.
2. Directive allocation system, which implies that the allocation of prod-
ucts and factors are through government directives rather than through
market mechanism. In our model we study only the case in which the
allocation of capital is under the control of government, while both
consumption and capital goods are still allocated through the market
mechanism. This setting weakens the role of government in allocat-
ing resources and products, especially for the governments in socialist
countries. However, this weakened setting is enough to demonstrate
the function of a directive allocation system under catching-up strate-
gies. In our model, it implies that kj is a control variable of the
government.
3. Deprivation of autonomy of producers, which means that production
activities in the economy are under close control of the government,
such as quantity control, investment licensing, export licensing, etc.
In our model, deprivation of production autonomy implies that pro-
ducers in both sectors face the output obligations, qj, imposed by the
government.
18Therefore, the control variables of the government are fp;r;wj;qj;kjg,
and the choice variables of an agent in sector j are his demand for prod-
ucts xij and his e⁄ort input ej. We investigate the interaction between
the government and agents in a two-stage game of complete information.
First the government determines the economic environment by specifying
the choice of policy variables fp;wj;r;qj;kjg. Second, facing the economic
constraints, the agents in both sectors make their own utility-maximization
decisions, and then the ￿nal allocation is realized as an equilibrium outcome.
As the ￿rst step, we solve the best responses of the economic agents, given
the exogenous parameters fp;wj;r;qj;kjg. We normalize the reservation
utility for agents in both sectors as 0.
4.1 Best Responses of Agents
Facing the exogenously given economic institutions or constraints fp;wj;r;qj;kjg,
the problem of an agent in sector j is as follows:
PA
maxfxij;ejg u(x1j;x2j) ￿ C(ej)
s:t: x1j + px2j ￿ wjej + r￿ kj
fj(kj;ej) ￿ qj
The price restrictions fp;r;wjg a⁄ect the income level and consumption
decision of the agent, the output requirement qj jointly with the capital al-
location kj determine the minimal e⁄ort input of the agent. The Lagrangian
of the problem is
Lj = u(x1j;x2j)￿C(ej)￿￿1
￿
x1j + px2j ￿ wjej ￿ r￿ kj
￿
￿￿2 [qj ￿ fj(kj;ej)]









wjej + r￿ kj = x1j + px2j
￿2 ￿ 0 and ￿2 [qj ￿ fj(kj;ej)] = 0
19Our interest is in the case that the quantity constraint is also binding at
optimality, otherwise the output obligation imposed by the government does
not a⁄ect the optimal e⁄ort inputs of the agents. It corresponds to the case









The condition of ￿2 implies that the marginal cost of e⁄ort is higher than the
marginal revenue/adjusted-utility of e⁄ort input when the output constraint
is binding. The value function of problem PA is the indirect utility function
of agents in sector j, denoted as vj(p;r;wj;qj;kj), and the optimal e⁄ort
input is ej(qj;kj).
Lemma 8 Given the economic environment fp;r;wj;qj;kjg, the indirect































@￿ kj = u0
1jr > 0
(32)



















The results of comparative statics analysis of vj and ej will be extensively
used in solving the optimal policy problem of the government in the next
section. The Appendix also provides the results of comparative statics
analysis on the demand functions x1j and x2j. Using the same example
as before, we derive the close-form demand functions, e⁄ort inputs and the
indirect utility function of the agent as below.
Lemma 9 Given the economic environment fp;r;wj;qj;kjg, in the example


















and the demand functions of agents in sector j are
x1j(p;r;wj;qj;kj) = ￿(wjej + r￿ kj) (36)
x2j(p;r;wj;qj;kj) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(wjej + r￿ kj)
p
(37)










4.2 Optimal Institutions for Implementing CAD Strategy
Having solved the best responses of the agents in both sectors, we now
study the optimal policy choices of the government that adopts the catching-
up strategy of rapid industrialization. As before, The objective function
of the government is a weighted average of social welfare and industrial
accumulation, and the problem of the government is
max W(p;r;wj;qj;kj) + ￿I
s:t: v1(p;w1;r;q1;k1) ￿ 0
v2(p;w2;r;q2;k2) ￿ 0
￿x11 + (1 ￿ ￿)x12 + I = ￿q1
￿x21 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22 = (1 ￿ ￿)q2
￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 = k
By substituting the budget constraints of both sectors and the balance con-
dition for consumption goods sector into the technology constraint of sector
1, we get a new expression for industrial accumulation, that is,
I(p;r;wj;qj;kj) = ￿[q1 ￿ w1e1(q1;k1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[pq2 ￿ w2e2(q2;k2)] ￿ rk
(39)
21It is obvious that the total industrial accumulation is equal to the sum of
total surplus of both production sectors. From (39), we get the follow-
ing results of comparative statics that, given other things equal, the total
















And the government￿ s problem is reformulated as:
P(M)
max W(p;r;wj;qj;kj) + ￿I(p;r;wj;qj;kj)
s:t: v1(p;w1;r;q1;k1) ￿ 0
v2(p;w2;r;q2;k2) ￿ 0
￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 = k
where ￿ > 0 measures the weight of industrial accumulation in the govern-
ment￿ s objective function. Here we have normalized the reservation utility
of the agents in both sectors to be 0. The restriction of vj ￿ 0 also im-
plies that the government has limited implementation power, and extreme
exploitation of a certain sector is not possible9. M = fp;r;wj;qj;kjg rep-
resents the set of available policy instruments of the government, in which
k1 and k2 are interdependent through ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 = k. Let vG(M) be
the value function of problem P(M), and M0 ￿ M be a subset of M, that
is, M
0
represents a smaller set of policy instruments. It is obvious that
Proposition 10 For M0 ￿ M, we have vG(M0) ￿ vG(M).
Proof. The proof is self-evident. For 8M0 ￿ M, suppose control variables




j￿ s are chosen by the government and y￿
j￿ s are equilibrium
levels of yj. In problem P(M), the government can simply choose zj = z￿
j
and yj = y￿
j, then achieve the same value of vG(M0).
9However, if we relax this constraint or introduce discrimination against certain group
of agents, i.e. the peasants, this framework can be used to study inequality under the
catching-up strategy, or famine in former socialist economies.
22The Lagrangian of problem P(M) is
L =
￿
￿v1(p;w1;r;q1;k1;￿ k1) + (1 ￿ ￿)v2(p;w2;r;q2;k2;￿ k2)
￿
+￿[￿(q1 ￿ w1e1(q1;k1)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pq2 ￿ w2e2(q2;k2)) ￿ rk]
+￿1v1(p;w;q1;k1;￿ k1) + ￿2v2(p;r;q2;k2;￿ k2) ￿ ￿3[￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 ￿ k]
￿1 ￿ 0 and ￿2 ￿ 0 are Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. The ￿rst-order conditions
are
p : (￿ + ￿1)@v1
@p + [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2] @v2
@p + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)q2 = 0
r : (￿ + ￿1)@v1
@r + [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2] @v2
@r ￿ ￿k = 0
w1 : (￿ + ￿1) @v1
@w1 ￿ ￿￿e1 = 0
w2 : [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2] @v2
@w2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)e2 = 0
q1 : (￿ + ￿1)@v1
@q1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ w1e1;q1) = 0
q2 : [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2] @v2
@q2 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(p ￿ w2e2;q2) = 0
k1 : (￿ + ￿1)@v1
@k1 ￿ ￿￿w1e1;k1 ￿ ￿3￿ = 0
k2 : [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2] @v2
@k2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)w2e2;k2 ￿ ￿3(1 ￿ ￿) = 0
￿3 : ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 ￿ k = 0
￿1 : ￿1 ￿ 0 ￿1v1(p;w;q1;k1) = 0
￿2 : ￿2 ￿ 0 ￿2v2(p;r;q2;k2) = 0
We restrict our attention to the cases that both v1 and v2 are strictly
positive at optimality, which implies that ￿1 = ￿2 = 0. Substituting the
results of the agent￿ s indirect utility function, (32), and e⁄ort supply, (33),
we get the optimal conditions as below:
23p : ￿￿u0
11x21 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)u0
12x22 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)q2 = 0
r : ￿u0
11￿ k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)u0
12￿ k2 ￿ ￿k = 0
w1 : u0
11e1 ￿ ￿e1 = 0
w2 : u0








































￿ ￿3 = 0













￿ ￿3 = 0
￿3 : ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 ￿ k = 0




Given this, the condition of p is implied by the balance conditions of con-
sumption goods, and the condition of r is implied by the identity of ￿￿ k1 +









Together with the balance conditions
k = ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2
(1 ￿ ￿)q2 = ￿x21 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22
There are seven equations with eight unknowns, so in this case, there is
some leeway for the government to implement certain allocation fxij;kj;eg.
This comes from the result that the optimal condition of interest rate, r,
becomes redundant given the conditions of wj￿ s are satis￿ed. The reason for
this result is that in the agent problem, e⁄ort input is uniquely determined
24by output regulation and capital allocation, and given this, r, and wj￿ s
jointly determine the agent￿ s income level. Though total income level and
relative price, p, are uniquely determined by the optimal conditions, the
composition of interest and labor income is not uniquely determined when
both r and wj￿ s are control variables of the government. We introduce a
natural behavioral restriction on government￿ s selection of the interest rate,
that is, the government sets the interest rate at the level of marginal capital




Proposition 11 For a government that implements CAD strategy using
three groups of policy instruments, the optimal choice of the policy variables











k = ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2
(1 ￿ ￿)q2 = ￿x21 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22
where xij and ej are given by the solutions to problem PA.
Using the same example as above, we will prove that the best allocation
for catching-up strategy is implementable, and will characterize the optimal
institutional arrangements for implementing that strategy. In that example,
we know the demand functions are
x1j(p;wj) = ￿(wjej + r￿ kj)
x2j(p;wj) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(wjej + r￿ kj)
p
















25We consider the case where both v1 and v2 are strictly positive at optimality,







e1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)A1k￿
1e￿￿
1












k = ￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2
(1 ￿ ￿)q2 = ￿x21 + (1 ￿ ￿)x22
Substituting the expressions of xij and ej, we have
















￿k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k2 = k
(1 ￿ ￿)(w1e1 + rk)
p
= (1 ￿ ￿)q2
To implement the best allocation
n
^ xij;^ kj; ^ ej
o
, the government can sim-
ply selects kj = ^ kj, which are
^ k1 =
￿(￿ + ^ I￿)





￿(￿ + ^ I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
k
1 ￿ ￿















￿(￿ + ^ I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
i￿ k￿ (40)
26and selects ^ qj such that
^ q1 = A1^ k￿
1 ^ e1￿￿
1









satisfy the optimal conditions (2-5). The interest rate is
equal to the marginal output of capital, that is






￿ + ^ I￿
￿1￿￿
2 h
￿(￿ + ^ I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
i1￿￿
k￿￿1 (41)
Since ￿(wjej + r￿ kj) = 1, we have
^ p =
(1 ￿ ￿)

















￿(￿ + ^ I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
i￿￿￿ (42)







￿ ^ r￿ kj
￿
j = 1;2




^ p; ^ r; ^ wj; ^ qj;^ kj
￿
= ^ xij
We summarize the main result of implementation as follows:
Proposition 12 The best allocation for the catching-up strategy,
n
^ xij; ^ ej;^ kj
o
,
is implementable by an institutional complex of price distortion, output con-
trol and directive allocation system. Speci￿cally,
n
^ p; ^ r; ^ wj;^ kj; ^ qj
o
imple-
ments that best allocation.
This is the main result of this paper. It demonstrates that the best
allocation for a catching-up strategy, which is not implementable in a free
market mechanism, can be implemented by an institutional complex of price
distortion, output control and directive allocation. In the best allocation of
27n
^ xij; ^ ej;^ kj
o
, ^ kj itself is a policy variable, and the government can directly
select capital allocation kj = ^ kj. Though e⁄ort input is not observable, it
is ex post veri￿able given the capital allocation kj and production function
fj(￿;￿). So through further output control ^ qj, the government can guaran-
tee the minimal e⁄ort input of ^ ej. Finally, by setting the relative prices,
f^ p; ^ r; ^ wjg, the government is able to determine the income and consumption
levels of the agents. For the comparison between ^ p and the optimal price
p￿, we have
Corollary 13 When ￿ > p￿
1, in implementing the catching-up strategy, the
government will distort downward the consumption good price, that is, ^ p <
p￿.









￿(￿ + ^ I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
#￿￿￿
> 1
since ￿ > ￿ and ^ I > 0 given ￿ > p￿
1.
The above corollary tells us that when a government wants to successfully
implement the catching-up strategy, it needs to reduce the relative price of
consumption goods. From this result, we understand the rationale behind
the selection of "price scissor" or "import substitution" policies by many
developing countries when they were pursuing a development strategy of
rapid industrialization. To compare the distorted interest ^ r to optimal























￿(￿ + ^ I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
#1￿￿
and therefore for ^ r < r￿, we need
"
￿(￿ + ^ I￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
#2
<


































￿2(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿2￿2￿
Corollary 14 When ￿ > p￿
1, (1) If ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > ￿￿, then
(
^ r < r￿ if I < 1
￿2￿￿
￿
￿2(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿2￿2￿
^ r ￿ r￿ otherwise
(2) If ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿, then ^ r ￿ r￿ always.
The condition ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > ￿￿ is equivalent to ￿ < ￿=(￿ + ￿), which
means that agents spend only a small portion of their incomes on capital
goods consumption. It is quite realistic for and generally satis￿ed by agents
in the developing countries, who spend most of their money on food and
nondurable goods consumption. Under this realistic condition, when the
accumulation level is relatively low, implementing a catching-up strategy
requires reducing interest rates. However, when the accumulation level
is too high, it will ￿nally drive up interest rates. Extreme accumulation
implies that much capital is allocated to the capital goods sector (see (27)),
and given that the e⁄ort input of the consumption goods sector unchanged,
it will eventually increase the marginal output of the capital of sector and the
equilibrium interest rate. Or intuitively, given the objective function of the
government, there exists a substitution relationship between consumption
and accumulation and extreme accumulation will squeeze out consumption
and drive up the marginal utility of consumption.
5 Necessity of the Three Institutional Components
In this part we explore in detail the e⁄ects of alternatively removing one of
the three components of the endogenous institutional arrangements on ￿nal
allocations and prices. Alternative removal implies that each time only one
29of the three components of the institutional complex is removed10. Each
removal changes one facet of the economic institutional arrangement, and en-
dows the agents with more freedom than before in their economic decisions.
For a policy variable that is removed from the pool of the government￿ s pol-
icy instruments, its equilibrium value will be determined through a market
mechanism. We will compare the equilibrium values of those variables with
their counterparts in best allocation.
5.1 Necessity of Output Control
What is the impact of removing output controls, when the other two com-
ponents of the institutional complex are kept unchanged? In this case, the
agents face only the institutional constraints of price distortion and directive
allocation of capital, but they can freely decide how much to produce. Un-
der the less restrictive institutional constraints of fp;r;wj;kjg, the problem
for the agent in sector j is now
maxfxij;ejg u(x1j;x2j) ￿ C(ej)
s:t: x1j + px2j ￿ wjej + r￿ kj






x1j + px2j = wjej + r￿ kj










, where the super-
script Q means that there is no quantity control over the producers. By
intuition, without output control, the agents will invest less e⁄ort and the
result will be less output of the corresponding product, which is proved in
the following proposition.
Proposition 15 Given the institutional constraints of price distortion and
directive capital allocation, f^ p; ^ r; ^ wj;^ kjg, the e⁄ort input of an agent facing
10Removing all the components implies a situation of no government intervention at all
(free market economy).
30no output control is lower than that in the best allocation, that is,
e
Q
j ￿ ^ ej (43)
Proof. Suppose not, then ^ ej < e
Q
j and the output of product fj(^ kj;e
Q
j ) >
^ qj, which implies that the quantity constraint is not binding in (PA). So ^ ej




ij ￿ ^ xij and ^ qj ￿ fj(^ kj;e
Q
j ).
Proof. It is self-evident, given ^ ej ￿ e
Q
j and the formula of demand functions.
These results demonstrate that there is an "over" supply of e⁄ort under
the full constraints of the institutional complex, in the sense that the mar-
ginal cost of e⁄ort input is higher than its marginal revenue (remember the
optimal conditions of problem PA). So when a government implements the
catching-up strategy, it will compel the agents to exert more e⁄ort than they
would do in free market situations. So to guarantee a certain level of e⁄ort
inputs, the government needs to impose the output requirements on the pro-
duction of the agents, and output control is indispensable for implementing
the best allocation for the catching-up strategy.
5.2 Necessity of Price Distortion
When the agents face only quantity control and directive allocation of capital
and there is no price regulation, agent j￿ s problem is to choose optimal
consumption and e⁄ort inputs under the constraints of fqj;kjg. In this case,
the demand for products in both sectors is determined only by consumer
demand, not by government demand. The problem for agent j is thus
maxfxij;ejg u(x1j;x2j) ￿ C(ej)
s:t: x1j + px2j ￿ wjej + r￿ kj
qj = fj(kj;ej)
The key di⁄erence between this problem and problem PA lies in the fact
that when price is liberalized, equilibrium price levels are determined only
by market equilibrium. It is obvious that the distorted prices in the best
31allocation, f^ p; ^ r; ^ wjg , are not sustainable as market equilibrium prices, since
there is at least excess supply of capital goods 1. So removing the component
of price distortion implies that the ￿nal allocation is (strictly) inferior to that
under the full constraints of the institutional complex.
In the problem above, ej is uniquely determined by qj = fj(kj;ej). In
our speci￿c example, the demand function is given by
x1j(p;wj) = ￿(wjej + rk) x2j(p;wj) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(wjej + rk)
p
The market equilibrium requires that
￿￿(w1e1 + rk) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(w2e2 + rk) = ￿f1(k1;e1)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(w1e1 + rk)
p
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(w2e2 + rk)
p
= (1 ￿ ￿)f2(k2;e2)











and again, the superscript P means that there is no price regulation by the
government.
Proposition 17 Given the same optimal policy controls f^ kj; ^ qjg, the rela-
tive price of consumption goods under additional price control is lower than
that without price control, that is
















and ^ q1 > q￿
1 and ^ q2 < q￿
2.
32It is intuitive that when removing the price regulation, the equilibrium
price of consumption goods becomes higher, but it is even higher than p￿,
the price that supports the optimal allocation in a Walrasian equilibrium.
This is because the production of both sectors is still distorted under output
control and directive allocation of capital.
5.2.1 Necessity of a Directive Allocation System
The government￿ s objective of establishing the directive allocation system
is to allocate those under-priced products and production factors to target
sectors, i.e. the capital goods sector. Speci￿cally, in our model, removing
the directive allocation system implies that the allocation of capital kj is
through market allocation schemes, rather than through government direc-
tive allocations. In this subsection, we investigate the e⁄ects of removing
the directive allocation system.
First, it is natural that, in a free market, if the interest rate is lower than
the market-clearing level (i.e. ^ r < r￿), there will exist excess demand for
it, and if ^ r > r￿, there then exists excess supply of capital. So it is self-
evident that the government needs to establish a directive allocation system
to direct the allocation of products and production factors at controlled
prices. In this subsection, we study a somewhat di⁄erent environment in
which the agents still face output controls imposed by the government. And
we will see why the best allocation is not achievable when there are only
price and output controls fp;r;wj;qjg. In this case, the agents can decide
their capital demand or supply so that their marginal rate of transformation
between capital and e⁄ort is equal to the corresponding level of the marginal
rate of substitution. Speci￿cally, we are interested in the question: When
capital is tradable at the regulated price ^ r, do the agents have incentives to
sell or purchase additional capital at the initial allocation of f^ xij; ^ ej;^ kjg?
We de￿ne the additional demand/supply of capital by an agent in sector j
as
￿kj = kj ￿ ^ kj (46)
where kj is the ￿nal per capita capital used for production in sector j. And
33the agent￿ s problem is
maxfx1j;x2j;ej;kjg u(x1j;x2j) ￿ C(ej)
s:t: x1j + px2j + r￿kj ￿ wjej + r￿ kj
fj(kj;ej) ￿ qj
Given the ￿xed output requirement qj, an agent can reduce capital demand
by increasing e⁄ort input, or vice versa. And the optimal combination of
capital and e⁄ort inputs is determined by relative prices and output require-
ments fp;r;wj;qjg. The Lagrangian of the problem is
L = u(x1j;x2j)￿C(ej)￿￿1
￿
x1j + px2j + r￿kj ￿ wjej ￿ r￿ kj
￿
￿￿2 [qj ￿ fj(kj;ej)]





ej : C0(ej) = ￿1wj + ￿2f0
j;ej
kj : ￿1r = ￿2f0
j;kj
￿1 : x1j + px2j + r￿kj = wjej + r￿ kj
￿2 : qj = fj(kj;ej)













x1j + px2j = wjej ￿ r￿kj + r￿ kj
qj = fj(kj;ej)
Remember in trinity institutional arrangements, the conditions for marginal























Using our speci￿c example, the condition for the marginal rate of trans-




^ wjej + ^ rk
^ r
ej ￿ ej￿kj ￿
^ wj
^ r
and the corresponding MRT conditions under trinity institutional arrange-
ments is
(1 ￿ ￿j)^ kj
￿j^ ej
=
^ wj^ ej + ^ rk
^ r
^ ej
where ￿1 = ￿ and ￿2 = ￿. We want to compare the value of kj to ^ kj.
As a starting point for analysis, we ￿rst assume kj = ^ kj, which implies
that ￿k1 = 0 and ej = ^ ej since the output requirements remain unchanged.
For sector j agent, it is obvious that
(1 ￿ ￿j)^ kj
￿j^ ej
>





To get the optimal condition to held, we need to reduce the capital input
below ^ kj and increase the e⁄ort input over ^ ej, and we get the following
result.
Proposition 18 When there are only regulations on prices and outputs,
f^ p; ^ r; ^ wj; ^ qjg, and capital is tradable, the demand for capital in either sector
is strictly lower than that in three-in-one environments, that is, kj < ^ kj, for
j = 1;2.
Given the opportunity of trading capital and if that trade can really
happen, we will have that the incomes of agents in both sectors will be
higher than before, that is, wjej ￿ r￿kj + rk > ^ wj^ ej + ^ rk, which will
result in greater demand for both products than under trinity institutional
arrangements.
Corollary 19 When there are only regulations on prices and outputs, f^ p; ^ r; ^ wj; ^ qjg,
and capital trade is feasible, there will be more consumption of capital goods
and less industrial accumulation than in the best allocation, speci￿cally,
xK
1j > ^ x1j IK < ^ I
It is worth metioning that the above results are based on the condition
that capital trade is feasible. Only under this condition could the agents
35purchase or sell capital at the regulated price ^ r. And with that opportunity,
the agents are able to adjust their e⁄ort inputs and consumption decisions,
and therefore a⁄ect the ￿nal allocation in this economy.
6 Conclusion
After the Second World War, many newly independent countries adopted
the catching-up strategy of rapid industrialization. However, for those
developing countries, prioritizing the development of industrial sectors, es-
pecially the heavy industry sectors, was against the comparative advantages
of their economies. And the catching-up strategy was not implementable by
laissez-faire market mechanisms. To implement that strategy, the govern-
ments need to establish a series of institutions that exclude the functioning of
markets and are able to mobilize enough economic surplus for industrial ac-
cumulation. Under the catching-up strategy, similar institutional arrange-
ments were established in those developing countries, no matter whether
they were socialist countries.
In this paper, we develop a simple two-sector model to explain the ra-
tionale behind that institution formation in those developing countries. We
prove that the best allocation for a catching-up strategy can be implemented
by an institutional complex that consists of price distortion, output control
and a directive allocation system. We further explore the counterfactual ef-
fects of alternatively removing one part of the institutional complex on ￿nal
economic allocations. We show the following results: (1) removing price
regulation will result in higher price of consumption goods, (2) removing
output control will induce less e⁄ort inputs by the agents, and (3) removing
the directive capital allocation system will result in more consumption and
less industrial accumulation. In short, none of these three components of
this institutional complex is dispensable for a successful implementation of
the catching-up strategy. In a simple two-sector model, this paper provides
a framework for understanding the endogenous institution formation under
the catching-up strategy in developing countries after World War II, and
shows that how a government can establish certain institutional arrange-
ments to implement allocations that are not implementable by laissez-faire
market mechanisms.
The formation and evolution of economic institutions in developing coun-
36tries under various development strategies is a important topic for research.
This paper represents a ￿rst step in this line of research, and more work
certainly needs to be done in the future. First, this paper studies just
the formation of special economic institutions under the catching-up strat-
egy, and does not explore the dynamic e⁄ects of that institutional arrange-
ments on the long run economic growth, which requires the development
of dynamic models. Second, the framework developed in this paper can
be extended to investigate various issues in economic development, such as
famines in the developing countries and socialist countries, the relationship
between inequality and development strategy, and so on. And ￿nally, for
the testable hypotheses that arise from the theoretical model, we also need
to verify those hypotheses through rigorous empirical research.
A Comparative Statics Analysis of xij￿ s













































wjej + rk = x1j + px2j
qj = fj(kj;ej)



















































￿x2jdp + kdr + ejdwj + rdk p ￿wj
￿f
0
































































































































1 ￿x2jdp + kdr + ejdwj + rdk ￿wj
0 ￿f
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